



## Islam and Muslims in Greater Serbian Ideology: The Origins of an Antagonism and the Misuse of the Past

Admir Mulaosmanović

To cite this article: Admir Mulaosmanović (2019): Islam and Muslims in Greater Serbian Ideology: The Origins of an Antagonism and the Misuse of the Past, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, DOI: [10.1080/13602004.2019.1652408](https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2019.1652408)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2019.1652408>



Published online: 18 Sep 2019.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 62



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



# Islam and Muslims in Greater Serbian Ideology: The Origins of an Antagonism and the Misuse of the Past

ADMIR MULAOSMANOVIĆ

## Abstract

*The aim of the paper is to detect nexus between religion, mythology and political thought, and investigate the possibility of establishment of Greater Serbian ideology as a conserved and omnipresent phenomenon. Messianic ideology (Third Rome ideology) disseminated from Imperial Russia all over orthodox world found fruitful ground in Serbia during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which caused a rise of fanaticism and hostility toward others. That hostility is more than obvious in relation to Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Albanians. Dominantly on the basis of Serbian authors, the paper explains this process and brings examples which could enlighten and present a clearer picture about the antagonism between religions and cultures in the Balkans, increase comprehension of atrocities committed by Serb soldiers in last two centuries.*

**Keywords:** Serbs; Serbian national ideology; Bosnian genocide; Muslims; Yugoslavia; Orthodox Christianity

There are people with unpleasant sweat, what to do, poor Muslims because they eat tallow. You know what happened in the village of Brdarica? There was a good man; he would invite people to his house, he would invite travelers to stop and refresh themselves. One morning he invited two travelers to come in; his wife was clean, and so was the refreshment they offered, but she was upset: "Oh, sorry, I was cleaning, I'm sorry that I stink", and she repeated that several times, "alas, I apologize, I stink". After the two men left, her husband said: 'You fool! They are the ones who stink, not you or this room'. The two men were Muslims, but the poor woman did not know that.  
*Bishop Atanasije, Manastir C'elije, Valjevo, Serbia<sup>1</sup>*

## Introduction

In order to make Serbian official policy toward Islam and Muslims during the nineties a bit more comprehensive, a broader scope and deeper analysis of Serbian views of

---

*Admir Mulaosmanović* is a staff member of the Social and Political Sciences program at the International University of Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Recently he became director of Foundation Alija Izetbegović. He has a PhD in history from the University of Zagreb, Croatia, in 2012. His area of interest is in modern and contemporary political and social history, international relations and ideologies. He is the author of three books (*Bihac'ka krajina 1971–1991*, Institute for History, 2010 and *Iskušenje opstanka*, Dobra knjiga, 2013, *Kratka politička historija Bošnjaka*, IUS-Stav, 2018.) and dozens of scientific and professional articles.

Muslims, and their historical development and various influences are *conditio sine qua non*. Without this approach, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the genocide committed against Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) would be just *a product of ancient hate between Balkan tribes*, as Slobodan Milošević liked to say about wars in Yugoslav successor states. Of course, this article can potentially help add fragments to such a picture, but the aim is to highlight the main forces which established the confrontation between South Slavs and set them in permanent political conflict from the very beginning of the existence of the common Yugoslav state (1918). Second, this article will show that official Serbian policy toward Muslims was just a spearhead of the Greater Serbian ideology despite the fact that socialists were in power in the last decade of the twentieth century.

The aim of this article is not to anathematize the *long duree* of Serbian policy (from *First Serbian uprising* in 1804) toward Islam and Muslims, but to emphasize the importance of mythology and collective consciousness based on it.<sup>2</sup> Also, this article should help in the understanding of two related factors; the Serbian Orthodox Church's position as an axis of official Serbian State policy and to clarify what the basis of Serbian Orthodoxy's views of indigenous Slavic Muslims was. Such an analysis is needed to contend with the radicalization, fear, and animosity amongst many Serbs, on the one hand, and the dehumanization of Islam and Bosniak Muslims, on the other.

It is noteworthy that, due to political processes, similar phenomena were present among all Yugoslav nations but the *Serb case* was particularly dominant and influential on in the historical development of South Slavs in this regard.<sup>3</sup> The *diferentia specifica* during the process of democratization was the fact that the others had new democratic, anticommunist political elites as leaders.<sup>4</sup> The second distinct characteristic was that the *Serb case* had the most far-reaching political consequences on the life of Serbian and neighboring nations. However, undeniably, the coordination and cooperation between political and religious establishments were crucial for the emergence of national political movements and nation-building processes.

## Religion and Mythology

Discussing the turmoil on the Yugoslav political scene in the late nineteen eighties, the *Serbian case* highlighted how far nationalism provoked and promoted religion and religiosity and *vice versa*. For Bulgarian researcher Nonka Bogomilova:

Religion becomes a vital element [...] when it is absorbed into group mythology. One of its essential functions in the process of its instrumentalization is to provide [...] its authority over and above other communities of its kind. This usage of religion is particularly intensive when the group inhabits an environment with a different religious affiliation.<sup>5</sup>

Even if advanced and efficient stage of ethnic homogenization process among Serbs during the eighties was masterfully orchestrated and led by Serbian communists (League of Communists of Serbia/LCS),<sup>6</sup> the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) has to be taken into consideration as crucial, because homogenization happened due to influential religious teaching and iconography. SOC has been described by Fikret Karčić as the spirit behind the Yugoslav People's Army—The ideologically Communist army of former Yugoslavia which became the fighting fist of the Serbian hegemonic project.<sup>7</sup> According to Dragoljub Đorđević, during “happening of people” (arranged

Serb public meetings all over Yugoslavia intentionally presented as spontaneous) propagators carried assembled pictures of political and historical leaders and holy men. For a wide range of academics, it resembled religious processions.<sup>8</sup> This is the one, if not the main reasons why Slobodan Milošević was created as undisputable authority and leader. The second one was the mass media which played a fantastic role in the creation of the *Vožd* (medieval title which connotes to a mighty and illustrious ruler).<sup>9</sup>

Due to tradition and the context of historical development of the nation, attention has to be dedicated to specific areas of Serbian culture in trying to build a proper explanation of Serbian attitudes toward Islam and Bosniaks. Serb politics and military campaigns cannot be explained without knowing their mentality and process of national identity building. Profoundly submerged in a wounded past, Serbian ideology and identity became prisoners of an imagined history rooted in the Kosovo Myth. Putting Serbian attitudes toward the past in explanatory pattern, Olivera Milosavljević said that it:

... is primarily characterized by a historical *consciousness*, according to which there was once an ideal nation, its *character* and moral (positive, patriarchal, furnishings, unspoiled by foreign influences, authentic, exclusive) and the ideal state (great, glorious, unique, patriarchal decorated). The second element of this *consciousness* is the image of *collapse* as a punishment for deviation from the *authentic way*.<sup>10</sup>

Such a pattern, when it is used to homogenize a nation, primarily plays a role in the wakening of messianic nature of the nation. Messianism as an explanation and essence of Greater Serbian ideology emerged and became a burden in both ways—understanding of the past and preparing the Serbian nation for the future. Political and ideological struggles between Serbian libertarianism and right-wing parties and movements (roughly bounded as a struggle between national myth-makers and rationalists) lasted during the whole period of Serbian independence. It ended with a victory for the rightists at the beginning of the 1970s.<sup>11</sup> After that, liberals became an insignificant group of intellectuals without serious impact on Serbian state and society on one hand, and the dehumanization of Islam and Bosniak Muslims on the other.

On the other hand, the attitude toward past also became the core idea in relation to others. Collapse as a punishment for deviation is extended on others due to their conversion to other religions, in particular Islam.<sup>12</sup> At that point, the idea of betrayal became dogmatic and one which allows brutal and nonhuman behavior toward the other. “For once others are perceived as obstacles, the rational choice is to get rid of them,” Bošković argued and added, “Once their humanity is abstracted or even called into question (‘they’ are so different from ‘us!’), their lives become expendable.”<sup>13</sup> This idea of betrayal remained anchor in Serbian literature, philosophy, historiography, and teaching of the Church and it shaped Serbian consciousness during modernity. This idea of betrayal remained anchored in Serbian literature, philosophy, historiography and teaching of the Church and it shaped Serbian consciousness during modernity.

In the eyes of Serbian ideology, betrayal, as a slimy characteristic of human nature, became a point of division: us and them, good and bad, worthy and profane, life and death, faith and disbelief. In that context, the killing of non-Serbs during the wars in the Balkans in the last two centuries was treated as a *divinely sanctioned mission work*. On the eve of the collapse of Yugoslavia and during the recent aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina, it emerged as a pattern for mass killing of Muslims.<sup>14</sup>

### The Process of Dehumanization and Myths

If Freud's dictum of the "narcissism of minor differences" is taken into consideration to explain hostility between ethnic groups that share the same territory, language and the past—which is the case of Bosniaks and Serbs—the crucial question emerges in the form of a reassessment of the main reason. It will almost always go beyond worldly reasons and set itself in the eschatological context of a religious mission.

Professor Smail Čekić, cited Predrag Milošević, the author of the book *Sveti ratnici / Holy Warriors* from 1989, where he wrote about and perfectly described the relation towards Balkan Muslims:

The Turks (local Muslims) were the real symbol of all evil in this world, the devil's seed ... However, Njegos's sense of justice and fairness was highly developed ... (just) as it can only be with an Orthodox ruler. Thus, without mercy he could wipe out the Turks, as an embodiment of evil and injustice. He and his servants were reminded by those heads (of the Muslims) everyday that evil can and must be fought against, and that this is the foremost Christian and human duty. The fight against evil was also Njegos's obligation to God. He yearned for revenge, revenge without mercy ... For Njegos, revenge was a holy, divine deed! Yes, he was in favour of peace and love among people, but among people only: this did not pertain to the beasts with human faces.<sup>15</sup>

In these sentences dehumanization is on the highest level; Slav Muslims are beasts—they should be exterminated. Muslims are Turks—they have to be expelled. The concept of betrayal is strongly emphasized through two mental projections; in a wider region of Balkans (not only Serbia and Montenegro) Muslims became the non-human element (betrayal of the human race) and Muslims as servants of and as foreign, unjust conquerors (betrayal of specific ethnicity and identity). When it comes to individual acts and roles of some historical figures, this concept actually emerges as a primal relationship even between ethnic groups and their members.<sup>16</sup> In the seminal Myth of the Kosovo Battle, for example, two individuals are emphasized; Miloš (K)Obilić as a hero and Vuk Branković as a traitor. Almost the same orientation can be seen when it comes to competing Serbian dynasties or political parties in their framing of one another.<sup>17</sup> In this particular case, it is important to know that the process of the spreading of Islam among South Slavs is explained predominantly through these lenses. Those who embraced Islam, according to Serbian ideology, sold the religion of their ancestors for their own economic improvement (*Prodali su vjeru za večeru*).<sup>18</sup>

Such worldview delivered a powerful folk literature with all symbolic features of described relationship. By using metaphorical and allegorical contexts, the Greater Serbian ideology wisely played the game of recontextualization, due to specific political reasons and needs for the process of the nation's reimagination. A good example of such reimagination/*replacement* is the case in which the term *Turks* is used for Bosniak Muslims (by which negative connotations that the Serbs have to the Ottoman Turks are projected to Bosniaks Muslims).<sup>19</sup> In another context, depending on the needs of ideology, these same Muslims are called converted Serbs.<sup>20</sup> Both cases deal with Bosniaks as a negative factor, invaders or traitors.

In the Serbian case, the founding myth, around which other myths grew up and were built was and still remains the *Kosovo Myth* with all its functional cycles.<sup>21</sup> It centers on the emergence of the martyred Serbian Nation *via* the struggle of Orthodoxy against Islam.<sup>22</sup> *The Battle of Kosovo* (1389), when the Serbs lost their state and became

vassals of the Ottomans, was presented as a battle of mythological proportions in which Serbs were defending not only their own country, but also “defending European Christian civilization against the barbaric infidel invasion from the Middle East”.<sup>23</sup>

It was this Myth recast which influenced Serb nation in the late 1980s and 1990s, thanks to terrifying propaganda, resulted in open hatred of Islam and Muslims. According to research made by Serbian researchers related to issues on Kosovo in 1999:

Stereotypes about Muslims (Bosniaks, A. M.) and Albanians have exclusively negative differentiated characteristics. Muslims are described as primitive, dishonest, not like the other nations, dirty, rude, petty, stupid, cowardly, and lazy. The stereotypes of Albanians are almost all negative [...] On each pair of characteristics more often they attributed negative than positive. The stereotype of Albanians is alike to the stereotype of Muslims. They are described as primitive, not like other nations, dirty, rude, arrogant, dishonest, petty, selfish, stupid, cool, cowards.<sup>24</sup>

Prince Lazar, namely, was the defender of the “whole of Christianity” from the invasion of “wild Turks”.<sup>25</sup> The theme can be seen in Serbian cinematography and visualization of Lazar, on one side, and sultan Murat I, on the other. Sultan Murat is almost always portrayed as an old, ugly and debauched person, but Lazar is young, kind and philosophically oriented prince and ruler. Even more so, the *Kosovo myth* is not only painted through a defense of all of the West Christian geostrategic position (*Antemurale Christianitatis*), it represents a broader picture of already mentioned eschatological salvation.

### Literature in Ambiguous Use

To this point, the explanation of Serbian culture, tradition and religion is comprehensive if the well-known context *Antemurale Christianitatis*, (the wall defending Christendom from the East ostensibly represented by the Serbs), also emphasized and underlined by Serbian ideologues, will be taken as clear and unambiguous. The clash of civilizations happened in their backyard and they have to respond to it, to prepare them to suffer for a higher cause.

When it came to the dissolution of Yugoslavia (1991–1999), in particular the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the Serbian nationalist narrative became more vital. As Anna Di Lellio cleverly observes:

It seems Serbia justifies Kosovo’s lack of historical rights to independent statehood in terms of its Muslim usurpation in the fourteenth century, Serbia’s symbolic identification of Kosovo with Europe’s defense from Islam maintains a strong hold on the European imagination. The contemporary context is the perceived Muslim invasions of Europe and its heightened perils after 2001.<sup>26</sup>

Since 1980, Serbian Orientalists also contributed to the dehumanization of the Muslim population in the former Yugoslavia as well as the teachings of Islam.<sup>27</sup> “The Muslims are portrayed as cultural aliens on European soil, traitors to the religion of their forefathers, the fifth column, a bridgehead for re-Islamization of Serbia or the Balkans and so on,” wrote Professor Fikret Karčić trying to explain their role in the process of defining others as less worthy.<sup>28</sup> Talking about Serbian oral literature, Gordana Đerić presented the stereotype which was very often used in relation between the two cultures.

What is consistent in Serbian/Orthodox oral literature is the principle where a man is always Christian and a woman is always Muslim. Simply, this narrative attempt implies

domination of one culture over another by sexual superiority. Even more, it attempts to humiliate male members of another group by converting Muslim women to Christianity through rape. Following this pattern, mass rape during the Aggression (1992–1995) emerged as a phenomenon founded in Serbian traditional prescription how to deal with Muslim women.<sup>29</sup>

Defined in such manner, Serbian culture and mentality appear as a dark side of Orthodoxy. For this reason, pagan influences on beliefs, culture and collective identity should be taken into consideration. The historical development of Serbian nationalism, actually, shows some interesting points and remarkable identity transformations which became core values of their collective memory and self-awareness. Pagan relicts who took a significant place in national identity and folk culture are placed in depth of belief and customs. Serbian saints and pagan gods have a lot in common,<sup>30</sup> but stories about fairies and elves, witches and vampires are generally about the power of invisible world crucially emphasizing the meaning of folk belief.<sup>31</sup> A new religious pattern emerged when syncretism and synthetic encounter between paganism (Slavic mythology and religion) and Christianity occurred.

#### *Paganism and Orthodox Christianity*

The Serbian people, according to Jovanović, were strongly connected to pre-Christian “natural religious understandings”. Certain continuity of old mythical performances and magical-religious practices of the folk tradition have been preserved within their Christianized form related to the rites of the life cycle and celebrations in the annual calendar. For example, Serb *slava* [celebration], even as a unique form of belief in Orthodoxy, is strong evidence of pagan influence.<sup>32</sup> In this way, Serbs did not betray the faith of ancestors. They just modernized it in a way to protect the spirit of the nation and preserve the essence of people. That’s why another concept of a clash of civilizations, where Christianity and Islam are the main forces, is actually questioned. The clash exists between historically developed traditions, not between civilizations or religions and teachings of *Holy Scripts*.

Second the important reason for such Serbian ideological matrix is due to the Russian Orthodox Church’s teaching. The influence of Russian ideology within Serb churches, especially *Third Rome* ideology, during the nineteenth century was strong enough to find its ways to the political sphere and to strongly affect it as well.<sup>33</sup> Since the time when Muscovy as the *Third Rome* was recognized as a defensive ideology (Monk Philotey, sixteenth century), it took time to become an offensive ideology through *Panslavism*. The Great Russian writer, Feodor Dostoyevsky, stated that Moscow will become the *Third Rome* when its Slavic brothers gather and unite.<sup>34</sup> By such expansion Imperial Russia launched the *Eastern Question*, however, it also emerged in more pragmatic field, as a need for Orthodox/Serbian expansionistic policies in the Balkans.<sup>35</sup>

When it comes to this ideological framework, some unstable explanations can occur and appear as obstacles in the understanding of historical development. What about socialism? How to prove a thesis about the continuity of Russian expansionistic foreign policy/ideology if there is ideological clash between the monarchist and communist periods?

Bojan Jovanović quotes Rozanov’s statement about the Russian<sup>36</sup> acceptance of Communism because they “never lived an Orthodox life”, the same pattern can be used for Serbs.<sup>37</sup> According to Nicolai Berdajev

In Russia, the Third International was created instead of the *Third Rome*, which adopted many features of the *Third Rome* ... It happened that Marx and Western Marxists were unable to predict, it happened that two messianisms were equalized—the messianism of the Russian people and the messianism of the proletariat ... The Communist revolution in a country inevitably leads to nationalism and nationalist international politics.<sup>38</sup>

In this context, the role of the Serbian media during the 1980s and 1990s also became vital. After the death of Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980), leading media in Serbia were slowly positioned as the center of propaganda and promoters of the Greater Serbia project.<sup>39</sup> Propaganda, according to Jacques Ellul, has to be total if propagators want to achieve their goals and to be successful. Serbian propaganda during the 1980s and especially during the 1990s was omnipresent and unfortunately very successful.<sup>40</sup> In order to achieve homogenization of the Serbian nation, propaganda demoted certain views through highlighting or neglecting certain topics with the aim of constructing a particular public opinion, imposing it as sacrosanct and of the greatest value. The same occurred inside mythological patterns (*sui generis*, *antiquitas*, *ante murale*) in terms of national ideologies.<sup>41</sup>

### **Narratives from/about Second World War**

In the case of the Second World War, for example, a new discourse distorted facts depicting the Partisan slogan of Bratsvo i Jedinstvo [Brotherhood and Unity] as treason, in the literature of Dobrica Ćosić and others.<sup>42</sup> It is possible to have a clear understanding of a new orientation most probably thanks to the former president of Bosnian entity RS Nikola Poplašen. He stated:

You are aware of the fact that the whole history was displayed incorrectly. Generations were completely miseducated and we should reconstruct the events leading to that war (Second World War, A.M.) and especially during the war, the contribution of the Chetnik movement and the role of the Communist Party.<sup>43</sup>

Awakened nationalism brought conflict situations among the South Slavs, which according to Serbian president Slobodan Milošević couldn't be avoided. Historical "injustice", celebrated and valued among people as legend, finally had to be corrected. Parallel history, which is retold at gatherings and meetings of the "chosen" was accepted as the sign of holiness. It was no longer "prohibited"; it became available to public touchingly recounting the glory, suffering and greatness of forbidden national heroes.

It's also important to touch on the overall social climate and not only taking into consideration the historical works, which can be observed as an example of failed historical revisionism even if historiography was a crucial argument for those ready to discuss openly about Yugoslavism on the basis of Serbian nationalism. The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) very strongly supported certain historiography projects considered as aforementioned historical revisionism before the emergence of the famous Memorandum (1986), a document that tendentiously "explained" Serbian position in Yugoslavia.

Among the many historians and other intellectuals who published stereotypical and mythical works, Vasilije Krestić and Veselin Đuretić need to be mentioned. They conducted research on the Second World War and during the 1980s, delivered analysis



emotionally which gave a completely different picture of what was happening in Yugoslavia at that time.

But, writers and artists had probably the most crucial role in creating Serbian public opinion which influenced Serbian policy as well. The Serbian dissident Mirko Kovač offered a good description of the role of “*kulturnjaci*” (people from the cultural field) as key factors of historical development. His texts were published from 1992 and revealed the contribution of many other intellectuals, but foremost amongst them Dobrica Ćosić (also known as the father of post-Tito Serbian nationalism) was called the main ideologue of ultra-nationalism.<sup>44</sup> Kovač’s exclamation is sufficient to understand to what extent Serbian writers were into politics trying to define it. “It will turn out that the policy is pure poetry,” he said.<sup>45</sup>

### *Media on the Dark Side*

Alida Bremer defined writers as holders of political ideas and the promoters of particular political points of view to the masses. She was engaged in an analysis of recent Serbian literature from the position of its ideological discourse. Bremer published the article *Recent Serbian Literature: Between history, myth and nation* in magazine *New Society*, Frankfurt volumes. The Belgrade magazine NIN conveyed this in its issue on 28 August 1992.<sup>46</sup> In this issue, the author presented the texts of Risto Đogo, Vuk Drašković, Dobrica Ćosić, Milorad Pavić, and Vidosav Stevanović successfully detecting mythomania and their effort to mythologize past. Some of the themes of the mentioned authors are closely related to World War II and take a dominant position as “corrective” of wrong historical picture. Basically, their works constructed stereotypes about others and created dehumanization of the *Other*, which caused fatal consequences in the period 1991–1999.

It is a wide scope of activities of intellectuals, certainly because of their personality and themes they preferred. Dragoš Kalajić, for example, strongly dehumanized members of other nations, especially the Bosniaks and Albanians because of their affiliation to Islam.<sup>47</sup> His discourse was very wide but World War II was not the basis of his mythomania. On the other hand, another writer, Vuk Drašković, incorporated WWII in the basis of his idea about the Serbs. In his notorious novel “Nož” [Knife], as a promoter of the Chetnik movement, he offered a very negative stereotype about Muslims (Bosniaks) and therefore, even if he was not supporting atrocities, facilitated the committing of war crimes against Muslims during the period 1992–1995.

Drašković portrayed Bosniak Muslims as traitors and liars (what else they can be?), people who are inherently untrustworthy. As proof he described their behavior from his own ostensible observation during World War II when they allegedly proved their hatred towards Serbs. Of course, Drašković tried to build an opinion regardless of the factual accuracy of events while he was establishing the “truth”. He denied and the existence of the “Muslim resolutions” (which spoke out against the Ustasha terror and pogroms against Serbs during WWII), Vuk Drašković does not accept them because the stereotype in that case would have been neutralized. In this work, therefore, Drašković (who was later the Foreign Minister of Serbia and Montenegro) ignored historical facts and depicted positively the murderous Chetnik movement. This even led the Chetniks of North America to finance Drašković’s book and thousands of copies were sent to Yugoslavia.<sup>48</sup> Vuk Drašković also was fiercely attacking

the fanatic attack of the intolerant Islam in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sandžak and Herzegovina ... and the resurrection of the Sharia tradition (i.e. of Islamic religious law), and ... the strategy of jihad (holy war), aimed at formation of an Islamic state in the Balkans.<sup>49</sup>

In his approach, Islamophobia is represented in all spheres and helps the Greater Serbian ideology to fortify its narrative; to emphasize threats (jihad, Islamic state, backwardness) and own values (Kosovo, Orthodoxy, Messianism, Europe).

In this 20-year period, media coverage showed two undeniable facts in most influential Serb newspapers and television shows when it came to Muslims. Firstly, it is about the role of media in building stereotypes and their tendentious reporting. The major role in the media campaign was taken by the daily *Politika* and weekly magazines NIN and DUGA. One of the rubrics in *Politika* that had a special task for carrying this out was under the section titled *Echoes and Reactions*. *Politika* had earlier played a special role in the late 1980s in the demonization of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. NIN and DUGA also played a role. As Sonja Biserko explains:

The smear campaign began after an incident in which a young mentally deranged Albanian soldier shot four and wounded five other soldiers on 3 September 1987. (Paradoxically, only one casualty was a Serb, but it did not stop the media to deftly manipulate that fact.) What followed were mass anti-Albanian Kosovo rallies and other protests, indicating the readiness of the new Serbian leadership to make Serbia, once and for all, “strong and unified”.<sup>50</sup>

Another notorious case was one in which a Serbian farmer in Kosovo named Djorđe Martinović falsely claimed that he had been sexually assaulted by two Albanians in 1985, it was played up by Serbian nationalists to stimulate anti-Albanian feelings.<sup>51</sup> State-owned media were openly announcing that Belgrade was making political preparations for the use of force against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosniaks. Accusations and threats were launched *en masse*. By these accusations, they tried to promote an alleged Islamic threat to Western powers—that the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at times even with the help of the Catholic and German clique, intended to form an Islamic fortress in the heart of Europe. The official military magazine *Narodna Armija* claimed that the Muslims intended to form an Islamic state, which would allegedly include Bosnia and Herzegovina, southern Serbia (Kosovo), Macedonia, and Albania extending to Turkey.<sup>52</sup>

### **Collapse of Yugoslav/Serb Political and Intellectual Elites and Islam During the 1990s**

Momčilo Krajišnik, a war criminal and President of so-called Parliament of RS, declared the following on 9 January 1993, in Belgrade, Serbia:

I have to say that demands for independent Republika Srpska were more powerful; they (members of so called Parliament of Republika Srpska, A.M.) don't want to have anything to do with Muslims; they don't want to relate to them [...]<sup>53</sup>

Due to clarification of Serb position apropos Vance-Owen peace plan, this statement made by Krajišnik during his meeting with the Serbian Political and Military establishment in Belgrade testified to the clear existence of racism and fascism within the top political structure. Biljana Plavšić, a Serb member of the B&H Presidency from 1990 and

one of the architects of Serbian ethnic cleansing in Bosnia Herzegovina during the nineties, expressed her opinion about Muslims which fits into this binary division of “us” and “them”. She “explained” this in pseudo-scientific terms.

I’m a biologist, I know genetics, and I know that the Serbs and Muslims are genetically structured in a way that they cannot live together. Ethnic cleansing is a natural phenomenon and it is not a war crime. Today, there are 12 million of Serbs, if six million are meant to die on the battlefield, there will remain another six to enjoy the fruits of their fight.<sup>54</sup>

It was a common opinion among Serb politicians and intellectuals about the need for a final solution of the Muslim Question out from Serbia’s imagined *lebensraum*. Warren Zimmerman, the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, said that the press in Zagreb and Belgrade offered the same arguments after 25 March 1991, almost at the same time as the *Karadordevo Agreement* between Tuđman and Milošević about the division of B&H took place and started talking about Bosnia as an Islamic state. He tried to emphasize the beginning of the political misuse of an ideological matrix and labeling Islam and Muslims as a real threat to Serbia and even to the rest of Europe.<sup>55</sup> It was the final stage of imposing a Serb-Croat historical agreement to divide BiH between themselves.

The final confrontation of Bosniak and Serbian disagreements in Bosnia and Herzegovina took place during the discussion of *The Memorandum of Sovereignty for Bosnia and Herzegovina*. All earlier disputes found themselves in this one place. Early on 15 October 1991, a document which leads B&H to the path of independence was adopted, however, Radovan Karadzic, after he saw that this process was unstoppable, said that the Muslim people would just disappear because once armed conflict started they could not defend themselves.<sup>56</sup> He very openly stressed that Muslims have chance to survive only if they will completely obey and submit to Serbian authority.<sup>57</sup>

The historian Mark Almond noted: “In practice, in the 1990s, Serb policies were likely to revive the very kind of Islamic fundamentalism which they were supposed to combat,” and he further added “The psychological need to create one’s ideal enemy to justify one’s own savagery is again apparent. Albanians and other Muslims are hated as much for not living up to their stereotype as for conforming to it”.<sup>58</sup>

## **Ideology and Foreign Policy**

Previously mentioned example showed and emphasized the fact that contemporary Serbian policy towards Islam and Muslims relied on two ambiguous pillars; the question of Bosnia (and Kosovo) as independent states (this question predominantly served for internal use and it was elaborated in terms of the Greater Serbian ideology) and the role of Serbia as a successor of Yugoslavia in countries which were in the Non-Aligned Movement (foreign issues).<sup>59</sup>

Elaborating the first pillar, it is quite clear that official politics were/are just extended arm of intellectual elite driven by the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian nationalists. The presentation of the Bosniaks through this Serbian master narrative had to be expanded to all strata of society, to serve and to be in compliance with the geo-political aims of Belgrade. There was obvious joint ventures between intellectuals and politicians, between Church, Academy and the State.

[...] the Bosniaks “wish to create a fundamentalist state, by overwhelming Bosnia with 500,000 Turks ... The influence of Islamic Bosnia shall then

expand through Sanjak and Kosovo onto Turkey and Serbia. Izetbegovic is a fundamentalist and representative of Turkey, and he is jointly plotting for the creation of a Greater Bosnia with it ... A large Muslim state is not only a danger to Serbia and Croatia. It also constitutes a danger to Europe and the United States ... The new borders shall resolve their problems and reduce tension.”<sup>60</sup>

Even if this statement about the position of Islam and Muslims in Yugoslavia belonged to Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, his opinion matched Serbian politics and ideology completely. A main goal of this approach for both sides was the division and disappearance of Bosnia. The same opinion was expressed in the daily newspaper *Novosti* (Belgrade) during mid-1991 by a Serb politician and the President of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Momčilo Krajišnik. He said that “... in a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbian nation considers, not exactly without reason, [...], as an Islamic state”<sup>61</sup> and he concluded accusing Bosniak leadership that “this apprehension is based on the fact that the idea of an Islamic state has been known for a long time, that there are those who were advocating it in the past, and those who still wish to see it created”.<sup>62</sup>

The political agenda which advocated the partition of Bosnia through expulsion of the Bosnian Muslims is hidden in these lines. Ruzmir Mahmutćehajić, a Bosnian intellectual observed: “Once the Muslims have been successfully denied and removed, Bosnia must disintegrate.”<sup>63</sup> Mahmutćehajić’s remarks imply that the disintegration of Bosnia means the disappearance of Islam. It also means the fulfillment of the Greater Serbian ideology that longs for a homogenous territory and culture, just like the Croats do as well. Finally, the disappearance of Islam would help establish the cleavages between civilizations.

### *Blame the Turks*

Actually, it was very common in the Serbian Assembly during the nineties to speak about Bosniaks using terms such as *Turks*, *balija*, etc. Branislav Vakić, a *Chetnik* Vojvoda or “Duke” and representative of Vojislav Šešelj’s Serb Radical Part at the Assembly of Serbia, for example, in September 1994, among other things, stated: “In early 1993, the Turkish converts, let me not honor them by calling them Muslims, [...]” tried to underline how Bosniaks should be treated.<sup>64</sup> He clearly explained Serbs’ attitude towards Muslims as undesirable in their neighborhood and unless they are far away, Muslims can never coexist with European Christians.

Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian Serb leader and a war criminal could not believe that Europe didn’t understand what Serbs were doing on their behalf. He said that “We (Serbs) defended Europe from Islam 600 years ago.” Meanwhile, he openly advocated war crimes as necessary for cleansing Muslims from Europe proper. His companion, a priest Vasilije Kačavenda, blessed Chetnik units as they embarked upon ethnic cleansing before the Holy Trinity Monastery/*Manastir Svete Trojice* (its construction permitted during the Ottoman Empire) at Vozuća/Zavidovići (BiH) in 1995: “Honestly, I can now feel like Emperor Lazar once felt in Kosovo. Let today’s Eucharist at Vozuća be a Kosovo dinner for you to get more strength and expel enemies forever.”<sup>65</sup>

A revealing example of the continuous toxicity and misuse of the Kosovo myth was underscored by Sabahudin Šarić who profoundly revealed this ideological pattern over the whole twentieth century. He noted:

Stojan Protić, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, said in 1917: “When our army crosses the Drina (enter Bosnian territory, A.M.), they will give the Turks twenty-four hours, if only forty-eight, to return to the ancestral faith. Who will not do so, he will be cut down, as we have done in Serbia ... In Bosnia, we will not deal with Turks in a European way, but by our way ... No more can there be Turks in Bosnia. They can escape across the Sava River or wherever they want”. It is clear that in this statement, the Serbian minister referred to Bosniak Muslims using the terms the *Turks* even though there were no ethnic Turks in Bosnia at the time, this pattern was to repeat itself after the genocide in Srebrenica in 1995, when the Serbian commander Ratko Mladić proclaimed that “he freed the Serbian city at the centennial of the Turkish siege”.<sup>66</sup>

A great tragedy shocked the world when in the Sarajevo Market place of Markale, more than 50 civilians were killed by Serbian shelling at the beginning of February 1994. The ideologue of Serbian nationalism, Dobrica Ćosić, allegedly couldn't accept that Serbs would carry out such an atrocity (even if until this crime Serb military forces had already committed untold horrible war crimes). Thus, he endeavored to establish the “truth” about Markale by calling another Serbian intellectual/ideologue the well-known Bosnian Serb historian Milorad Ekmečić to give his opinion. Ekmečić replied to Ćosić that: “This barbarity act can never be committed by the Serbs. This is a *jihad*. Only in the Islamic holy war is it possible to cruelly kill for Allah even fellow believers.”<sup>67</sup>

## Conclusion

The dissolution of the common Yugoslav state was followed by the attempt of Serbian and Croatian political elites to achieve their historical, messianic goals; to establish a permanent border between Catholicism and Orthodoxy by erasing the Ottoman Muslim and Bosniak presence in the region once and for all. A conversation between Dobrica Ćosić and Radovan Karadžić during 1991 shows the evidence of this messianism when Ćosić stated to Karadžić that he was completing a historical process of the unification of the Serbs, and added, “This is our ideology from Karadjordje (The leader of the first Serb uprising against the Ottoman Empire, 1804)”.<sup>68</sup>

The main impediment for achieving this goal, which represented a victory of anarchistic politics and went back to the “blood and soil” political nationalisms of the nineteenth century, was the multicultural composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its indelible Ottoman and Bosniak presence. The fact that Bosnia had long served as a bridge between East and West was unacceptable to those who wanted to erase all diversity and pluralism. This was the main reason why even the fabled Stari Most or Ottoman Old Bridge of Mostar was deliberately destroyed (9 November 1993), while its reconstruction completed in July 2004 celebrated the renewal of Bosnian spirit.

Even though the destruction was horrible and massive atrocities were productive for the narrow-minded ethnocentric goals that aimed to dehumanize Muslims, Bosnia still survived as a pluralistic society. The real problem for Bosnian democracy today is the existence of political actors who continued with glorification of murderers and war criminals. In the end, such attitudes cannot produce the necessary catharsis to face the past. Neither, can it create the acceptance of historical burden by condemning the policies based on the narratives of dehumanization.

## NOTES

1. Recent speech given under the auspices of Bishop Atanasije, 7 April 2004—Manastir Ćelije, Valjevo, Serbia. Vreme, “Justin je fino mirisao” [Justin Smelled Good], 15 April 2004, <http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=375301> (accessed 6 February 2017).
2. For more information about it see: Philip J. Cohen, “The Ideology and Historical Continuity of Serbia’s Anti-Islamic policy”, *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2–3, 1997, pp. 361–382.
3. Nonka Bogomilova also expressed an opinion about a similar topic:

It is quite clear and widely accepted that in modern Balkan history the myth of the unique mission of state and nation, for the monopoly of which Balkan states still compete, is increasingly becoming a tool for the realization of the separate interests of the rival states, including territorial, economic and national-identity interests. The mythological archetype of the state and national mission is increasingly becoming the object of political manipulation.

See, Nonka Bogomilova, “A Philosophical Approach to the Religion—National Mythology Synthesis”, *Filozofija i društvo*, Vol. 3, 2009, pp. 83–96.

4.

[...] Serbia remained the only East European country in which the former communist elite managed to defeat its opponents in a series of competitive, if not entirely free elections, and preserve such essential elements of institutional and ideological continuity with the old system as the communist party’s control over the police, army, large state enterprises, and the most important mass media for more than a decade after the fall of the Berlin wall. As one Serbian political scientist has noted, this persistence of the “old regime” made Serbia different even from cases in which the former communists returned to power (Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania), whether because the former communist parties in these countries had transformed themselves into socialist or social-democratic parties on the west European pattern (Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania) or because they were forced to spend a considerable time in the opposition (Bulgaria, Romania).

See: Veljko Vujačić, “Reexamining the Serbian Exceptionalism Thesis”, *Filozofija i društvo*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2002, pp. 205–246.

5. Bogomilova, “A Philosophical Approach”, *op. cit.*, pp. 83–96.
6. Every Yugoslav republic and Yugoslav People’s Army had its own League of Communists.
7. Fikret Karčić, “Distorted Images of Islam: The Case of Former Yugoslavia”, *Intellectual Discourse*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1995, pp. 139–152.
8. Dragoljub B. Đorđević, “Religijsko-crkveni kompleks, raspad druge i budućnost treće Jugoslavije (fragmenti)” [Religious—Church Complex, Collapse of the Second and the Future of Third Yugoslavia (Fragments)], *Raspad Jugoslavije* [The Collapse of Yugoslavia], *Filozofija i društvo*, Vol. 6, 1994, pp. 329–340.
9. It is interesting that one influential commercial in late eighties was for men’s perfume Vožd. Vožd je stigao [Ruler has come] was the message of the commercial just when Milošević successfully reached absolute power.
10. Olivera Milosavljević, “Nacionalizam u službi politike moc’i. Tri kontroverze u shvatanjima srpskih intelektualaca početkom i krajem 20. veka” [Nationalism in the Power Politics’ Service. Three Controversies in the Understanding of Serbian Intellectuals in the Beginning and end of the Twentieth Century], 1999, *Filozofski fakultet Beograd*, [http://www.komunikacije-.org.yu/komunikacije/casopisi/sociologija/XLI\\_2/d003/document](http://www.komunikacije-.org.yu/komunikacije/casopisi/sociologija/XLI_2/d003/document) (accessed 17 February 2017).
11. With regard to the liberal intelligence, historian Latinka Perović said that, in fact, they were defeated during the well-known purge within the Communist Party in the 1972. After that, the nationalists definitely triumphed. See: Latinka Perović, “Teško breme odgovornosti (interview uradili D. Ilić i P. Brebanović)” [Heavy Burden of Responsibility (Interview done by D. Ilić and P. Brebanović)], *Reč*, Vol. 62, 2001, pp. 83–90.
12. It is interesting that in church scripts (Russian, Serbian and generally orthodox) coin “Hagara’s grandsons” for Muslims was used very often. In this approach, racism is omnipresent by emphasizing Abraham’s second wife’s name as a mother of Arabs/Muslims. Hager or Hagara, as she is known, was not only Abraham’s second wife, but she was also Arab. In this particular case it is possible to testify how religious teachings helped in establishing a deep cleft between civilizations.
13. Alexandar Bošković, “The Image of the Other—Friend, Foreigner, Patriot?”, *Filozofija i društvo*, Vol. 3, 2005, pp. 95–115.

14. When Petar Petrović Njegoš (1813–1851) wrote in *Gorski Vijenac* [The Mountain Wreath] that it (killing of Muslims) is a high moral act, it became frequently a license to do so not only in Serbian nationalist literature but in armed conflicts as well.
15. Smail Ćekić, *The Aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Planning, Preparation, Execution Part 1*, Sarajevo: Institute for the Research of Crimes Against Humanity and International Law-KULT/B, 2005, p. 242.
16. With SOP assistance, symbols such as “Kosovo testament”, “Heavenly Kingdom” “Heavenly people”, “Kosovo dinner”, “Milos Obilić”, “Treason” and so on, entered the Greater Serbian ideology. Most of the symbols were taken from the New Testament and clad in national attire. About that, see very solid research: Sabahudin Šarić, *Velikosrpska ideologija* [The Greater Serbian Ideology], Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu i Naučnoistraživački institut Ibn Sina [Institute for the Research of Crimes against Humanity and International Law—University of Sarajevo and Ibn Sina Research Institute], 2010.
17. Darko Zlojutro, “*Ispovest Vuka Drašković'a koja c'e šokirati: Više ljudi ubijeno je u Sarajevu od srpskih bombi nego Srba od NATO raketa*” [Confession of Vuk Drašković That Will Shock: More People were Killed in Sarajevo by Serbian Bombs Than Serbs from NATO Missiles], 17 March 2015, <http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/politika/1480608-ispovest-vuka-draškovića-koja-ce-sokirati-srbiju-vise-ljudi-ubijeno-je-u-sarajevu-od-srpskih-bombi-nego-srba-od-nato-raketa-foto> (accessed 22 May 2016).
18. “They sold faith for dinner”—a very common explanation amongst Serbs about the process of conversion and the spreading of Islam amongst fellow South Slavs.
19. Šarić, *Velikosrpska ideologija* [The Greater Serbian Ideology], *op. cit.*, p. 55.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
21. Miloš Knežević, “*Ciklusi Kosovskog mita*” [Cycles of Kosovo Myth], *Nova srpska politička misao* (NSPM), Vol. 3–4, 1999, pp. 171–183.
- 22.

Full historical truth, [...], would undermine the mythical monolith about people—lonely fighter-righteous, which, in addition, has an order from God to stand staunchly on the border of the Christian world. And, again, according to the myth, as the suffering of Christ was starvation one who constantly stands on the border of good and love, and so it was ruthlessly punished than those defended and from themselves and from their inner evil, and this people, even compromise European Christian faithful guardian of boundaries, of the same Europe is punished her incomprehension. Why? Because its size is larger than the European. Because the truth that Europe cannot fathom. The truth that Serbs already have by birth.

See: Đokica Jovanović, “*Politička i ideološka upotreba nacionalnog mita*” [Political and Ideological Use of the National Myth], in *Dve hiljade godina hrišćanstva na Balkanu* [2000 years of Christianity in the Balkans], *Žumir*, Vol. 7, pp. 109–117.

23. *Ibid.*
24. See Šarić, *Velikosrpska ideologija* [The Greater Serbian Ideology], *op. cit.* Author used a study done by Dragan Popadić and Mikloš Biro, “*Autostereotipi i heterostereotipi Srba u Srbiji*” [Autostereotypes and Heterostereotypes of Serbs in Serbia], *NSPM*, Vol. 6, No. 1–2, 1999.
- 25.

The Serbian Orthodox Church position was expressed even more explicitly by Bishop Amfilohije in the early stages of the War when he—anticipating victory—cheerfully announced that God has given the Serbs a new chance to achieve their dream of living in one state. Similar optimism was expressed when he said, in the same breath: God expects something great from this People, when He positions the People in the focus of world events. We need to endure, as the victory belongs to the innocently crucified. Bishop Amfilohije stated a year later, when the War was at its fiercest, that The War in Bosnia today is a struggle by our brethren in Bosnia and Herzegovina for priceless liberty and the honour of the entire Eastern Orthodoxy. “... Let God grant every assistance and the power to withstand the pressures of the world, as our Lord Jesus Christ has already been victorious over such pressures”.

See: Sergej Flere, “Was the Bosnian War (1992–1995) a Full-fledged Religious War?”, in *Politicization of Religion, the Power of State, Nation, and Faith: The Case of Former Yugoslavia and Its Successor States*, ed. Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, London: Palgrave-McMillan, 2014, pp. 33–53.

26. Anna Di Lellio, “The Missing Democratic Revolution and Serbia’s Anti-European Choice: 1989–2008”, *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1989, pp. 373–384.

27. Norman Cigar, "Serbia's Orientalists and Islam: Making Genocide Intellectually Respectable", *Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 1994, pp. 147–170.
28. Fikret Karčić, "Distorted Images of Islam: The Case of Former Yugoslavia", *Intellectual Discourse*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1995, pp. 139–152.
29. Gordana Đerić, "O nemim i glasnim stereotipima: Konstruisanje etničkog karaktera u usmenoj književnosti" [On Silent and Loud Stereotypes: Constructing of Ethnic Character in Oral Literature], *Filozofija i društvo*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2015, pp. 105–120.
30. Sveti Vid [Saint Vitus] was the ancient Slav supreme god; later it was recognized as a healer of diseased eyes by Orthodox Christians. Over time St. Vitus became cult which links paganism and Christianity. *Vidovdan cult* was defined in Miodrag Popović's work *St. Vitus and the holy cross* in 1976. He says: "Vidovdan cult, which mixes historical reality with a mythical reality, the real struggle for freedom from surviving pagan inclinations (revenge, slaughter and sacrifice, reviving the heroic ancestor), potentially contains all features midfield with untamed mythical impulses". Quoted in Šarić. *Velikosrpska ideologija* [The Greater Serbian Ideology], *op. cit.*, p. 58. It is important to say that Vidovdan as a religious ceremony was not established till the nineteenth century. On that day (28 June, two events occurred: Battle of Kosovo /1389/ and Assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo /1914/).
31. The mythologization of the past particularly is visible in folk poetry of all Balkan peoples. [...] For example, Marko Kraljević, as a heroic figure [...] his biography is "reconstructed according to mythical norms". Fairy gave birth to him, his wife was also a fairy. Just as the Greek hero, Marko killed the three headed dragons. Again, just as in the Greek myths (Hercules). See Bojan Jovanović, *Duh paganskog nasleđa u srpskoj tradicionalnoj kulturi* [Spirit of Pagan Heritage in Serbian Traditional Culture], Novi Sad: Svetovi, 2000.
32. "The Serbian slava is good example of the reinterpretation of a pagan rite in Christian terms: the clan ancestor became a Christian saint, frequently St Nicholas". See A. P. Vlasto, *The Entry of the Slavs into Christendom. An Introduction to the Medieval History of the Slavs*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
33. Third Rome ideology and Rome/Byzantine as the center of Christianity is also ambiguous concept due to messages of Bible. Actually, Rome is a symbol and place where syncretic process (interference of Christianity and Paganism) started.
34. See Peter J. S. Duncan *Russian Messianism. Third Rome, Revolution, Communism and After*, London: Routledge, 2000.
35. On this, see Milorad Ekmečić, *Dugo kretanje između klanja i oranja—Istorija Srba u Novom veku 1492–1992*. [Long Movement Between Slaughtering and Plowing—History of Serbs in the New Century, 1492–1992.], Beograd: Evro Giunti, 2010.
36. A fruitful explanation of Russian messianism was given by Milan Subotić. He emphasized theoretical approach of Berdajev and thinking of influential historians about continuity of the idea of the "Third Rome". Also, in Eisenstein's movie "Ivan Grozni", which is about unification and the fulfilling of a new Soviet Russia mission, messianism is woven into message of the movie. Also, through the words of Hans Kohn, Subotić very vividly describes this mentality:

Russian mass in the dogmatic Marxist utopianism finds similarities with their own faith. Marxism attracted them because the promised salvation is based on the principles of science and technology [...] Russia has also once again become the Holy Land, which leads mankind to salvation

See Milan Subotić, *Sricanje slobode. Studije o počecima liberalne političke misli u Srbiji 19. veka* [Spelling of Freedom. Studies on the Beginnings of Liberal Political Thought in Serbia of the Nineteenth Century], Niš: IFDT-Gradina, 1992.

37. Jovanović, "Duh paganskog nasleđa u srpskoj tradicionalnoj kulturi" [Spirit of Pagan Heritage in Serbian Traditional Culture], *op. cit.*, p. 22.
38. *Ibid.*
39. In fact, all documents published at that time indicated that the forces behind the Albanian revolt were clandestine cells of Marxist-Leninist orientation, officially described by Yugoslav authorities as counter-revolutionaries and irredentists. However, the Serbian leadership realized that these Bolshevik terms cannot appeal to the European public in the 1980s. Therefore, they opted for labels which had already been introduced in dealings with the Muslims. Overnight, counter-revolutionaries became *mujahidins* and Islamic fundamentalism replaced dogmatic Marxism.

See Fikret Karčić, "Distorted Images of Islam", *op. cit.*, pp. 139–152.



40. Nidžara Ahmetašević, *I riječima su ubijali (izvodi iz magistarskog rada prevedeni sa engleskog)* [Killing with Words (Extracts from the Master's Work Translated from English)], *Proljeće* [Spring] 2003, <http://odjek.ba/index.php?broj=02&id=35> (accessed 14 April 2016).
41. Pal Kolsto, "Procjena uloge historijskih mitova u modernim društvima" [Assessing the Roles of Historical Myths in Modern Societies], in *Historijski mitovi na Balkanu—zbornik radova* [Historical Myths in the Balkans—Collection of Papers], ed. Husnija Kamberović, Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju [Institute of History], 2003, pp. 11–39.
42. Ugo Vlasisavljević, "Etnički identitet i rat" [Ethnic Identity and War], 2004, <http://odjek.ba/index.php?broj=04&id=01> (accessed 14 April 2016).
43. Duga, "Intervju sa Nikolom Poplašenom" [Interview with Nikola Poplašen], 16 July 1993. In *Srbi o Srbima (Jesmo li čudovišta)* [Serbs about the Serbs (Are We Monsters)], Sarajevo: CID, 2001, pp. 347–359.
44. Mirko Kovač, "Dobrica Čosić—glavna narikača" [Dobrica Čosić—The Main Narrator], in *Srbi o Srbima (Jesmo li čudovišta)* [Serbs about the Serbs (Are We Monsters)], Sarajevo: CID, 2001, pp. 212–213.
45. Mirko Kovač, "Ruganje demokratiji" [Mockery of Democracy], in *Srbi o Srbima (Jesmo li čudovišta)* [Serbs about the Serbs (Are We Monsters)], Sarajevo: CID, 2001, pp. 192–193.
46. Dragan Žunić, "Teorija i metafora (sociološko-književna hermeneutika i razumevanje raspada)" [Theory and Metaphor (Sociological–Literary Hermeneutics and Understanding of Decay)], 1994, <http://147.91.230.48/ift/izdanja/casopisi/ift/VI/d28/document> (accessed 22 May 2016).
47. For Bosnian politician Ivica Mišić, *Kvazi Arabi protiv Evropljana* [Quasi Arabs against Europeans] in magazine *Duga* (5 September 1987) was genocidal platform. See Admir Mulaosmanović, *Bihac'ka krajina 1971–1991. Utjecaj politike i političke elite na privredni razvoj* [Bihać's Krajina 1971–1991. The impact of Politics and Political Elites on Economic Development], Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju [Institute of History], 2010.
48. Pavao Jelović, "Marksističke papazjanije" [Marxist Compound], *Dom i svijet*, Vol. 387, 2002, p. 3.
49. Čekić, *The Aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Planning, Preparation, Execution Part 1, op. cit.*, p. 239.
50. Sonja Biserko, "Reporting from the Writing Fields or How to Prepare Genocide in Five Years", 11 April 1997, <http://balkansnet.org/biserko.html> (accessed 22 May 2016).
51. Carole Rogel, "Kosovo: Where it All Began", *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2003, pp. 167–182.
52. The magazine *Jugoslovenska Armija* [Yugoslav Army] asked a leading Serbian orientalist to analyze the differences "between them and us, the Muslims and the Christians" for their readers. According to this paper, the Muslims were nothing else but completely "poisoned Islamic fundamentalists". See, Čekić, *The Aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Planning, Preparation, Execution Part 1, op. cit.*, p. 240.
53. "Stenografske beleške sa proširene sednice Saveta za usaglašavanje stavova o državnoj politici" [Stenographic notes from the extended session of the Council for Coordination of State Politics], in *Srpske političke elite i Vens-Ovenov plan 1* [Serbian Political Elites and Wens – Owen's plan 1], ed. Vladimir Petrović, Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju [Institute of Contemporary History], 2010, p. 40.
54. Avdo Huseinović, "Ubijali su i riječima: Novinari, mediji i javne ličnosti koje su služile interesima genocidnog režima" [Killing by Words: Journalists, Media and Public Figures in the Service of Genocidal Regime], 2012, <https://hamdocamo.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/ubijali-su-i-rijecima-novinari-mediji-i-javne-licnosti-koje-su-sluzile-interesima-genocidnog-rezima> (accessed 14 April 2016).
55. Warren Zimmerman, *Izvori jedne katastrofe* [Sources of a Disaster]. Zagreb: Globus, 1997, p. 143.
56. Kosta Nikolić, "Bosna i Hercegovina u vreme raspada SFRJ 1990–1992. (studija)" [Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Time of the Breakup of SFRJ 1990–1992 (Study)], in *Bosna i Hercegovina u vreme raspada SFRJ 1990–1992. Tematska zbirka dokumenata* [Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Time of the Breakup of SFRJ 1990–1992. Thematic Collection of Documents], ed. Kosta Nikolić, Beograd: Fond za humanitarno pravo—Institut za savremenu istoriju [Center for Humanitarian Law—Institute of Contemporary History], 2011, pp. 11–57.
57. But, what Orthodox think about Muslims showed the 79-year-old, who also goes by the nickname Pop Žučo, was a commander of the Chetnik division of the Serbian army from 1992 to 1995. He fought in the Bosnian war, where his battalion was stationed in Grbavica, near Sarajevo. As an Orthodox archpriest, he didn't only fight—he also baptised other soldiers and presided over their burials. As a priest in military fatigues, Čarkić was in charge of blessing the weapons that would be used in the fighting—

- often to fire upon the civilian population of Sarajevo. "I blessed the arms of my people to defend them from the Balia," he says, using a derogatory Serbian word for Muslims that roughly translates as "primitive". He also added that "during war he always was a soldier of Christ". See: Telegraf.rs, "INTERVJU SA POPOM ČETNIKOM DIGAO BALKAN NA NOGE: Sad sam u penziji, ali još sam raspoložen da ubijam ljude!" [Interview with the Chetnik—Priest Raised a Concern in the Balkans: I'm Retired Now, But I'm Still Keen to Kill People!], 22 May 2016, <http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/2154619-intervju-sa-popom-cetnikom-digao-balkan-na-noge-sad-sam-u-penziji-ali-jos-sam-raspolozen-da-ubijam-ljude> (accessed 23 May 2016).
58. Mark Almond, *Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans*, London: Mandarin, 1994, p. 196.
  59. After September 1961, when it hosted the founding conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Belgrade once again hosted the officials of the Movement on the 50th anniversary of its founding on 5–6 September 2011. Arrival at the jubilee conference confirmed the 106 delegations from four continents. It was Serbian attempt to strengthen its position among *Third World* countries, most of them with a Muslim majority.
  60. Smail Ćekić, *The Aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Planning, Preparation, Execution Part 2*, Sarajevo: Institute for the Research of Crimes against Humanity and International Law-KULT/B, 2005, pp. 1050.
  61. Ćekić, *The Aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Planning, Preparation, Execution, Part 1, op. cit.*, p. 235.
  62. *Ibid.*
  63. Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, *Bosnia the Good: Toleration and Tradition*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 1997, p. 198.
  64. Ćekić, *The Aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Planning, Preparation, Execution Part 2, op. cit.*, p. 972.
  65. Šarić. *Velikosrpska ideologija* [The Greater Serbian Ideology], *op. cit.*, p. 62.
  66. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
  67. Admir Mulaosmanović, *Iskušenje opstanka. Izetbegović'evih deset godina* [Temptation of Survival. Izetbegović's Ten Years], Sarajevo: Dobra knjiga, 2013, p. 149.
  68. Ćekić, *The Aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Planning, Preparation, Execution, Part 1, op. cit.*, p. 236.